Topic: General Hillier's Legacy (split from:Top general fights to cut the fat in the Forces)

[Old Sweat]

This Canadian Press story which appears in the Winnipeg Free Press, is posted under the Fair Dealing provisions of the Copyright Act.

Hillier slams 'field marshal wannabes' in revised edition of his memoir

By: Murray Brewster, The Canadian Press

OTTAWA - Canada's former top soldier is warning that "field marshal wannabes" are angling to take a bigger role in directing the day-to-day operations of military forces in the field.

Retired general Rick Hillier says a policy paper is circulating around senior levels of the Harper government that suggests the Clerk of the Privy Council and the deputy minister of defence take a greater role to "guide" the military.

The former chief of defence staff writes, in a new postscript for the softcover edition of his memoirs, that there is a growing movement within the federal government to establish a system of micro-management that could extend from the highest reaches of Ottawa all the way down to individual combat units.

The paper was produced within the last year and has been the subject of some discussion, according to Hillier, and would give senior bureaucrats greater powers than those already spelled out in the National Defence Act.

The notion that the military needs greater guidance on how to conduct operations irked Hillier.

"What crap!" Hillier writes in the new edition of A Soldier First, an advance copy of which was obtained by The Canadian Press.

"The National Defence Act is clear — our sons and daughters need to have direction from the leaders that Canadians have elected, and they need to have that direction passed through the Chief of Defence Staff without interference from bureaucrats who have no preparation or training for this task, and no responsibility for those lives.

"Any governments who permit anything different should have their rear ends booted out of office by moms and dads of those serving sons and daughters."

Defence Minister Peter MacKay was unavailable for an interview, but in statement he suggested the relationship between civilians and the military is productive and not strained.

"Whether it is our mission in Afghanistan, disaster relief in Haiti, support to the 2010 Olympic and Paralympic games or any other initiative, the professionalism and dedication of all personnel is paramount to our success," he said.

"I'm proud of the excellent efforts that numerous departments and agencies have put into our mission in Afghanistan. But I'm even more proud to work with the incredible people that make up the defence community."

Military and political science historian Desmond Morton said Hillier's warning about the creeping centralization of authority should be heeded because of the "control freak" reflex of the current government.

The general also took a swipe at parliamentarians for last year's investigation to torture claims in Afghan prisons and what the government knew about it. He accused all parties being uninterested in facts and declared soldiers "would be run over in a heartbeat if those involved thought it would give them a few more votes."

Hillier added excessive government secrecy over documents fuelled the debate.

"Now, I believe that those who have turned our Parliament into an embarrassment are unworthy of those in uniform who serve with such valour," he wrote.

Stories of the battles between the bureaucracy and Hillier, who retired as the country's top military commander in 2008, are legion around Ottawa. In the first edition of his book, published last year, he stunned many in the political community with his frank account of how the Conservative government toyed with the notion of yanking day-to-day control of the war away from the ground commander in Kandahar and placing it with the country's ambassador in Kabul.

He railed against the Ottawa culture in the book and referred to the bureaucrats who cooked up the proposal as "field marshal wannabes," who shouldn't be trusted with authority beyond what Parliament has already granted them.

"I absolutely refused, for more than a year before my retirement, to condone any direct role in the command and control of the CF contingent in Afghanistan by any of the bureaucrats," he writes in the new edition of the book.

"This would have been dangerous to our young men and women, to the mission and to the bureaucrats, who had had no preparation, training or experience in such command and were not qualified for it."

Hillier was not available for an interview.

Morton said the former general's fear about bureaucrats who know nothing about the military is well-founded because unlike previous generations they've not been educated or exposed to the culture.

He blamed that on the Liberals who killed off the National Defence College, an institution with a sizable civilian enrolment, but said Hillier has alienated them further with bellicose rhetoric.

"Folks at foreign affairs or even the mounted police used to be educated in what these fellows in green were doing and why, but that's not the case anymore," Morton said.

"They don't know what use the military is, and Hillier has some justification for wondering about the kind of creeps rose the ranks, but to my knowledge, as chief of defence staff, he did very little about it."

Hillier made a lot of speeches and raised the public profile of the Forces, but Morton said he questions what concrete action was taken to educate federal officials.

[E.R. Campbell]

Shades of Bob Fowler who didn't just guide the military; he saddled, bridled and rode it as it he saw fit.

[Old Sweat]

Folwer's intellect and force of personality dominated the Department and the CF. It seems from reading the above story that Hillier is referring to a different set of circumstances. It may be that someone in PCO is trying to get around the provision in the NDA where the MND is the only person who can issue orders and direction to the CF, and must go through the CDS.

This sort of power grab which essentially would put the CF under the control of the DM originally appeared nearly 30 years ago in the reorganization that produced NDHQ. In that plan, which did not survive contact with Jadex, the chain went MND to DM to CDS. It would drag the CF into the Public Service chain, to the detriment of the former. It also to me raises the prospect of another manifestation of the mandarin attitude that they really are the ones who run Canada, and the politicians (and the soldiers and the mounties and of course the public) are misguided children who just get in the way.

I would be concerned very concerned at the prospect of senior public servants meddlng in operations. Politicians are bad enough, but they at least have legitimate constitutional responsibilities.

[dapaterson]

To be fair, the poor decisions of Hillier saddled DND with the dot COMs and other oversize organziations with little purpose in life.  Add to that his direction to recruit hundreds of people into trades that were overborne and we are left with todays' CF - budgetary stresses that were foreseen and easily avoidable with sound leadership.

Perhaps this reaction is to his failed leadership in many dimensions.


(It is amusing that we still call Chris Wattie's book about Hillier an autobiography, though)


(edit: typos.)

[Nerf herder]

Shades of Bob Fowler who didn't just guide the military; he saddled, bridled and rode it as it he saw fit.

I just threw up in my mouth remembering those years.....and a couple more kitten just died.

Regards

[Tango18A]

Funny how nobody wanted to pony up ransom money when Fowler disappeared in Africa. Coincidence??? Or he just got set free because his captors were tired of dealing with his S**T.

[E.R. Campbell]

To be fair, and I agree with Old Sweat about Fowler's intellect, Fowler dominated because the CF was very poorly led, nowhere worse than at the top.

To make matters worse, senior officers posted to Ottawa became fascinated with the machinery of government, including e.g. defence policy and  the defence budget - both of which are in the exclusive domain of the civil service. The end result was admirals and generals tried to meddle in fields in which they were bound to, and inevitably did, perform badly and they left a leadership and management vacuum in Festung Rideau that Fowler was only too happy to fill.

Fowler didn't hate the CF; quite the contrary he tried - and failed - to institute some sensible military organizational, management and planning reforms that the CF brass would not or could not implement.

I think I can safely say that Mr. Fowler would have been horrified - on both an intellectual and a personal level - had he been ransomed; he would have been equally horrified had lives been risked (and worse lost) to rescue him. He was, all his professional life, a negotiator and a manager and a diplomat. He knows how to get things done - including how to get the UN Secretary General's personal envoy released. Most likely the people who managed his release just said, "What would Fowler do?" and then did it.

The problem in NDHQ wasn't Fowler: it was too many inept, second rate uniformed people.

[Rifleman62]

Robert McNamara and Lyndon B. Johnson ran the military in a war, and look at the results. Things could be worse in Canada if the DM from VAC becomes the DM at DND.

[E.R. Campbell]

Part of this, I'm guessing is a holdover from former Clerk of the Privy Council Kevin Lynch's well known mistrust of DND and, especially, military management skills.

He was, routinely, frustrated by DND and the CF crying about "rust out!" "stretched too thin!" and then shouting "Ready Aye Ready! Here we go" whenever the government called and then by DND, having accepted a commitment, coming to the centre for more money.

[pbi]

The problem in NDHQ wasn't Fowler: it was too many inept, second rate uniformed people.

Hit it right on. After the legendary JADEX, IMHO we went into a period of decline in the quality and focus of senior military leadership, as the WWII generation of soldiers was replaced by a cohort of flag officers who were increasingly being socialized as bureaucrats, technocrats, and all other sorts of -rats, but much less so as leaders who could inspire people.

This was (again IMHO) reflected by the tone of senior professional military education, which increasingly emphasized the flag officer as a uniformed equivalent of a senior civil servant. One can only speculate to what degree this lack of emphasis on fundamentals and what Hillier later called "transformational" leadership led us into the Dark Years (which we are so fond of blaming completely on  politicians, media and an ignorant public).

Although I never never thought much of most of the GO/FOs I encountered over the years, I really became aware of the absence of a "leadership" culture amongst our GO/FOs when I attended USMC C&SC Quantico in 97-98. There I was exposed to a broad range of visiting flag officers of all US services who were dynamic, inspirational, and could speak convincingly abouit a wide range of subjects without shuffling through a stack of notes, or droning on in a pathetic monotone. They looked and acted like genuine leaders.

Fast forward to today, and I do believe we have come a very long way (at least in the Army...) in the quality, dynamism, intellect and charisma of general officers. Whether we wish to admit this or not, I think our increasingly close relationship with US forces at very senior levels over the last decade has had a "rub-off" effect.

The unintended second-order effect has been, I think, that a number of senior types in the civil service (and perhaps a few politicians as well) have become distinctly nervous. My bet is that they would much prefer the bland, grey, mild-mannered bureacratic apologist who will pliably agree to anything, as opposed to the confident, well-educated and well-informed leader, far more worldly than the average civilian equivalent he deals with, who may challenge their narrow-minded view of things.

One of the great weaknesses of our civil service is that it lacks a true institute of professional education such CFC provides the CF (as opposed to a trade school such as Asticou). I agree fully with those who say that as a nation we desperately need a rebirth of NDC: good luck convincing those who really need the education it would offer them.

Cheers

[ArmyRick]

I say no to yes men!

[Jim Seggie]

Too many bureaucrats who wannabe soldiers and generals.

Too many soldiers et al that wannabe bureaucrats.

My two cents.

[Tommy]

Too many bureaucrats who wannabe soldiers and generals.

Too many soldiers et al that wannabe bureaucrats.

My two cents.

I'll subscribe to that newsletter!

Big +1 right here.

[Jim Seggie]

For years our senior leadership was not very colorful and not given to being "leaders with vision".

This spread down to the Lt/Capt and Sgt/WO level....where a bit of dash and colour can be the difference between success and failure.

[Bruce Monkhouse]

When I read the thread title I assumed he meant the content of forums like this.................

[Retired AF Guy]

For years our senior leadership was not very colorful and not given to being "leaders with vision".

This spread down to the Lt/Capt and Sgt/WO level....where a bit of dash and colour can be the difference between success and failure.

Another problem is that we adopted many of the practices from the business world. How many times did you hear about "PY's," "serving the customer" or "pushing a product?"

[Jim Seggie]

Another problem is that we adopted many of the practices from the business world. How many times did you hear about "PY's," "serving the customer" or "pushing a product?"

yes....we had this discussion in 97 in Bosnia. CSM Adm Coy refused to call soldiers "Customers" unlike the Pay Sgt.....
I refuse to call my soldiers "clients". They are not "clients" - they are soldiers.

[ArmyVern]

yes....we had this discussion in 97 in Bosnia. CSM Adm Coy refused to call soldiers "Customers" unlike the Pay Sgt.....
I refuse to call my soldiers "clients". They are not "clients" - they are soldiers.

Customer Services Section in Base Supply has existed since my father was a Pte at least. That term has nothing to do with business model adaptation. I refused to call soldiers "clients"; they are my "customers".

I think there's a thread on this site where we've already travelled down this road ... and discovered that many of those "business" terms were actually carried to the civilian sector from the military who originated them.

[Good2Golf]

Hmmm....Fowler compared to the likes of Boyle & Baril?  IMO, people can say what they will about the iron hand of Bob Fowler, but is was exactly for the reasons the Edward Campbell noted - someone had to show institutional responsibility/leadership and there was not a lot of it happening in senior levels of CF leadership.  The 90's weren't a decade of darkness just because of reduced budgets.

Robert Fowler was instrumental in stewarding a number of developments within DND and specifically the CF that stand the service in good stead today...none the least of which was further institutionalized in Hillier's first round of CF Transformation as one of the new found Commands that few complain about.

2 more ¢

Regards
G2G

[ObedientiaZelum]

Customer Services Section in Base Supply has existed since my father was a Pte at least. That term has nothing to do with business model adaptation. I refused to call soldiers "clients"; they are my "customers".

Customer Service Section Afghanistan responding to a client.

[ArmyRick]

One of the important qualities of military leadership is to inspire your troops. Someone like Rick Hillier was excellent at that where as Jean Boyle, well, lets leave it at that...

[ArmyVern]

Customer Service Section Afghanistan responding to a client.

I think that client wants a refund!! 

[Kat Stevens]

He'll have to return all the pieces to customer service, or if not possible, a fully completed and signed off loss damage report, in triplicate.

[Spr.Earl]

Another problem is that we adopted many of the practices from the business world. How many times did you hear about "PY's," "serving the customer" or "pushing a product?"

My own 2 cent's worth is I agree with the above post,I forget when it started the Officer's over the years came back talking like C.E.O.'s and treating the Military like it was a Blue Chip Corporation.
I and others noted the change in their demeanour,speech and the micro management.

 The Military is not a Blue Chip Corporation,we are here to serve our Nation no more and no less.
And while we are on the Topic of the Ex CDS where is he in this shamefull abuse of Vet's by the present Government?
I thought he was all for one and one for all.

[dapaterson]

I remember in Rick Hillier's book "Soldier First" he talks about not being too impressed with the bearocracy at DND. He was apprently offered by the MND at the time an oppurtunity to separate the CF from DND and make it answer only to elected officials such as the PM and the MND.

He also mentioned that he did not like the bloat, empire building and heel dragging on important issues these beaurocrats did.

Maybe they are the first to be done away with?

Gen Rick (ret'd) grew the three dot COMs out of the DCDS - essentially, he grew the HQ burden, which in turn grows bureaucracy.

He's had a free ride for far too long - between increasing HQ bloat, overmanning some trades to the detriment of others and ordering benefits without legal authority his tenure, in retrospect, created far more problems than it solved.  Unfortunately, I don;t think we'll see any objective assessment i nthe near term - too many up-and-comers have latched on to him as a role model, and too many journalists like him as a source for pithy quotes to ever do any hard assessment of his failings.

[ArmyRick]

What trades has he (Gen Hillier) got overmanned? I know infantry is heavily overbourne but at same time, I don't think they expected as many people to stay in either.

[MCG]

What trades has he (Gen Hillier) got overmanned? I know infantry is heavily overbourne but at same time, I don't think they expected as many people to stay in either.

When one occupation is overborne by 4 didgits, that single occupation will force several other occupations to stay in the red.

[PuckChaser]

But is that Hillier's fault? I didn't see him making any speeches to just join the infantry, he just wanted people to join the CF in any capacity. 4 digits overborne is the fault of the Recruiting system or whoever does the forecasting for retention numbers (DGMC?).

[dapaterson]

But is that Hillier's fault? I didn't see him making any speeches to just join the infantry, he just wanted people to join the CF in any capacity. 4 digits overborne is the fault of the Recruiting system or whoever does the forecasting for retention numbers (DGMC?).

Recruiting: "We've reached the infantry quota for the year."

HR Systems managers: "Then stop recruting infantry and concentrate on the other trades where there are shortfalls"

Army: "Then stop recruting infantry and concentrate on the other trades where there are shortfalls"

General Rick: "Well, b'y, bring more in!"


(Note: This is not 100% verbatim, but it's close enough)


The Infantryman trade (NCMs; officer occupation is Infantry) is sufficiently overborne that there will be some bad times ahead, with no new blood coming in.


Rick Hillier made gut decisions without information that have long-term operational impacts on the CF that he never considered.  In terms of inspiring the troops, he was a great CDS.  In terms of setting the conditions for long term stability and success, not so much.

[ArmyRick]

What makes you so certain that General Hillier simply made "gut decisions"? I don't for one second beleive he just flung around a plan willy nilly. From what I read in his autobiography, he put alot of thought and planning into his CF transformation.

His ideas were based on the short falls he witnessed and expirienced in several capacities (CO RCD, Commander 2 CMBG, Commander Multinational Brigade NW I beleive in Bosnia and as commander of ISAF).

He knew full well that civilian beaurocrats were making decisions from Ottawa about how we were conducting operations in Bosnia and Afghanistan, taking away a good portion of command and control from those in theaters of ops. He was able to remove that civilian control of Military on ops. Now decisions reside with commanders in theater. They answer to a military chain of command, who in turn answers to the MND and the PM (elected officials).

Have you taken the time to hear Rick Hillier's side of the story? Read his book, don't make assumptions.

[CDN Aviator]

Have you taken the time to hear Rick Hillier's side of the story? Read his book, don't make assumptions.

I have read his books and heard his side of things, from him personaly. The assesment made by dapaterson is accurate.

[PuckChaser]

The assesment made by dapaterson is accurate.

In your opinion. I have yet to see dapaterson with any evidence that Hillier was behind it. Until I see some proof, its just hot air.

[CDN Aviator]

Until I see some proof, its just hot air.

Proof of what ?

That he had great intentions but saddled us with multiple new commands that sapped personel and effort away from an already stressed system ?

That under his watch recruiting was allowed to go out of control ?

If Hillier's intent really was to remove civillian beurocrats from ops decisions, what price did we pay for that.

We got the .COMs, that what we paid.

[PuckChaser]

That under his watch recruiting was allowed to go out of control ?

I'm looking for proof Hillier was directly responsible for overborne combat arms trades.

[dapaterson]

I'm looking for proof Hillier was directly responsible for overborne combat arms trades.

Was there direction given by the CDS to continue recruiting infantrymen despite the SIP target for infantrymen being achieved?  Yes.


I believe it's reflected in RODs for AFC in that timeframe.

[E.R. Campbell]

I'm looking for proof Hillier was directly responsible for overborne combat arms trades.

It was called by various names but there was, always, a committee, chaired by the CDS, that made decisions about a variety of issues - recruiting quotas being one of the important ones. We You The CF gets its high level quotas - x people, y of whom are flag and general officers, for z dollars - from parliament (the Blue Book) but the details, this many infanteers, that many sailors, and so many loggies was made by that top level military committee. It's a pretty fundamental force structure decision based on the CDS' views and priorities, one that, properly, belongs at the top; if the CDS didn't/doesn't preside over that decision he should.

I don't see people saying Rick Hillier was a bad CDS - just that some of his decisions may have consequences he appears not to have foreseen.

[PuckChaser]

I believe it's reflected in RODs for AFC in that timeframe.

Are these DWAN only? Internet only gives the description of the AFC.

[Michael O'Leary]

In your opinion. I have yet to see dapaterson with any evidence that Hillier was behind it. Until I see some proof, its just hot air.

I would suggest that if Hellyer is still vilified today for every single detail of Unification because it happened on his watch, then Hillier will similarly have to be held accountable for actions taken during his tenure.  Unless you can demonstrate that he had no knowledge of it and no control over the issues of manning that "robbed" positions from other trades to over-man select ones.

[GAP]

I think Hillier's legacy can be viewed from two prespectives.....

the CF member's POV..

the civilian's POV....

I think they radically differ, but the one thing nobody can take away from him is the level of awareness of the CF he created across Canada...

[Jed]

I don't think the CF point of view is of one common perspective compared to the civilian point of view wrt Gen Hillier Ret'd

The respect given to the CF in the eyes of civilians and the common soldier is still far past anything it has been in the last 20 yrs thanks to the General. We can live with the not so good decisions that occurred on his watch. It is far better than when we were surviving the 'decade of darkness'.

[CDN Aviator]

We can live with the not so good decisions that occurred on his watch.

I would rather we did not "live with" those decisions. I would much rather we take steps to correct the mess we now have on our hands.

We can still have the public image we enjoy now and correct our organizational failings. Those 2 things are not mutualy exclusive.

[Jed]

I agree that we do not want to live with the results of 'imperfect decisions'. But we don't have to take the previous leader's down to make course corrections. Just determine what needs to change and get on with it.

[CDN Aviator]

But we don't have to take the previous leader's down to make course corrections. Just determine what needs to change and get on with it.

I'm not putting Hillier down and i don't think anyone else is but If we are to make changes, we have to acknowledge how we got in this mess in the first place.

[Bass ackwards]

I've noticed a number of comments that suggest an over-recruiting of infantrymen.

I've been out for a long time. My reading over the years suggests that our infantry battalions have been chronically understrength (hence the use of reservists to round out deployed forces -the Medak Pocket comes to mind as one example of that).

My question is (opsec permitting): how are those battalions doing now ? Are they overmanned ? Still understrength ? Right where they should be ?

Please folks, I'm not arguing any point here. I've got no dog in this hunt. I'm just very surprised to see Gen. Hillier go from being a rock star to being the guy who screwed things up.

Or am I just reading this whole thing wrong to begin with ?     

[Infanteer]

Although I haven't checked the PSR and what not lately, the Infantry is overmanned by 1200-1400 positions.  However, this overmanning is deceptive:

1.  The overmanning is almost exclusively at the Pte/Cpl level.  The trade is around even for MCpl and Sgt (due to an increase in promotions over the last few years) but short Warrant Officers.

2.  The overmanning is a bit deceptive due to structural reasons - the table of organization built into every Infantry battalion's Unit Establishment Report is flawed and does not represent doctrinal (if such a thing can be said to exist) or de facto employment of the infantry.  I've crunched the figures, and over half of this surplus is actually being used in positions we've always taken for granted (ie: 10 man rifle sections) which we're not actually manned for according to the Preferred Manning Level - by the (financial/administrative) books, each Rifle Section gets 8 guys.

[dapaterson]

Although I haven't checked the PSR and what not lately, the Infantry is overmanned by 1200-1400 positions.  However, this overmanning is deceptive:

1.  The overmanning is almost exclusively at the Pte/Cpl level.  The trade is around even for MCpl and Sgt (due to an increase in promotions over the last few years) but short Warrant Officers.

2.  The overmanning is a bit deceptive due to structural reasons - the table of organization built into every Infantry battalion's Unit Establishment Report is flawed and does not represent doctrinal (if such a thing can be said to exist) or de facto employment of the infantry.  I've crunched the figures, and over half of this surplus is actually being used in positions we've always taken for granted (ie: 10 man rifle sections) which we're not actually manned for according to the Preferred Manning Level - by the (financial/administrative) books, each Rifle Section gets 8 guys.

By the book, each section gets 8 infantrymen, and in the event of operations, is filled out with two Reserve infantrymen.  That preserves a large enough section to conduct peacetime training, but also keeps PYs available for other things the Army wants to do.  In a perfect world we'd fully resource everything we want; as we ahve finite resources, the Army has to pick and choose what it does and how it does it.  Having the rifle sections established at 80% of wartime strength saves 2 PYs per section, 6 per platoon, 18 per company... and so on, meaning those PYs are available for other things instead.

The real problem with infantryman having in excess of 1000 over PML is the impact on other occupations - they are unable to recruit because the CF is at or above its target strength.  So while the Inf Bns are overmanned (in numbers, if not by rank) other trades are short without near-term relief in sight.


Gen Hillier did many good things for the CF during his tenure.  But other decisions were made that caused and continued to cause damage to the CF such as inadequate planning of the stand-up of the dot COMs, pushing out allowances and benefits without authority to do so and over-recruiting of Infantrymen.  It's not a simple black/white, bad/good assessment; it's trying to acknowledge the areas where mistakes were made, to learn and improve.

The CF (and particularly the Army) is notoriously bad at introspection, self examination and self assessment.  Saying "I made a mistake and will improve by doing this different" is in fact a great sign of leadership.  Unfortunately, too often it's mistaken for a sign of weakness, not strength.

[Bass ackwards]

So if I'm reading you right (dapaterson), every infantryman over quota equals another tradesman (ie: Navy signaller or Airforce weapons tech or even an Army whatever) who cannot be hired ?

This makes more sense now.

[Infanteer]

By the book, each section gets 8 infantrymen, and in the event of operations, is filled out with two Reserve infantrymen.  That preserves a large enough section to conduct peacetime training, but also keeps PYs available for other things the Army wants to do.  In a perfect world we'd fully resource everything we want; as we ahve finite resources, the Army has to pick and choose what it does and how it does it.  Having the rifle sections established at 80% of wartime strength saves 2 PYs per section, 6 per platoon, 18 per company... and so on, meaning those PYs are available for other things instead.

Although I don't doubt that this policy exists somewhere, the doctrine and the de facto SOP on the Battalion floors certainly don't work by this idea.  If 8+2 reservists is the policy, than it should be worked into doctrine and everything else.  Policy and reality are clearly at conflict, and the real result is that other supporting functions within the Rifle Battalion take the hit.

There is an aspect of train as one would fight here - you don't man tanks with 3 out of 4 crew.  After 8 men cuts 3 away for crew, you're down to 5 if you have a full section.  While the Infantry, more than most other trades, works with fluctuating manpower as a rule, doesn't mean purposely undermanning the "raison d'etre" is right.

In this day in age why we can't budget to ensure crews, teams and sections would recieve priority for manning at the Pte/Cpl level is beyond me.

Gen Hillier did many good things for the CF during his tenure.  But other decisions were made that caused and continued to cause damage to the CF such as inadequate planning of the stand-up of the dot COMs, pushing out allowances and benefits without authority to do so and over-recruiting of Infantrymen.  It's not a simple black/white, bad/good assessment; it's trying to acknowledge the areas where mistakes were made, to learn and improve.

The CF (and particularly the Army) is notoriously bad at introspection, self examination and self assessment.  Saying "I made a mistake and will improve by doing this different" is in fact a great sign of leadership.  Unfortunately, too often it's mistaken for a sign of weakness, not strength.

Agreed.

[Infanteer]

So if I'm reading you right (dapaterson), every infantryman over quota equals another tradesman (ie: Navy signaller or Airforce weapons tech or even an Army whatever) who cannot be hired ?

Yes - and that's the perfect example of how a half-a** solution only means headaches in the future.

[dapaterson]

Although I don't doubt that this policy exists somewhere, the doctrine and the de facto SOP on the Battalion floors certainly don't work by this idea.  If 8+2 reservists is the policy, than it should be worked into doctrine and everything else.  Policy and reality are clearly at conflict, and the real result is that other supporting functions within the Rifle Battalion take the hit.

The Army's inability to coherently communicate internally rears its ugly head again.  All I know is that D Inf and senior representatives from the three Reg F regiments and four Land Force Areas were all present when this was briefed, discussed and decided. 

If only the Army had a body tasked with maintaining doctrine and promulgating it.  Or, if only the body tasked with doing such things actually did them...

[ArmyRick]

The doctrine side for infantry? Between Inf School, CTC and LFDTS, somebody should be able to punch up the doctrine (or two, one for the properly equipped enemy aka conventional warfare and one for COIN?).

How many of those overbourne in the infantry trades are guys waiting to be put on PCAT or sent to a JPSU from severe injuries in Afghanistan? Does anybody have a statistic for that?

Also, NEVER mind cutting infantry. If we do what General leslie suggest, cut the "fat" from NDHQ then we would be able to recruit for other trades, yes? If infantry being overbourne hurts others trades, then so does HQ being overbourne. If dontrinally we are suppossed to have 735.5 soldiers in a battalion (example) then thats what we should strive for. Not leave XX positions open for reserves to man in the event of ops. That also doesn't work when say a domestic snap operation comes up (Ice storms, earth quakes, forest fires and floods as examples). Manning should be done properly.

Personally, I find it funny that we are complaining of having too many combat troops (Not too often in history of the CF did you hear that).

Now, the .coms, not every thing is perfect when it first comes out and tweakings are neccessary as a result of lessons learned. So I am guessing, a single CAN OP COM would be ideal to replace CEFCOM, CAN COM and CANOSCOM? I do think CANSOFCOM should remain its own entity, thats a tiny organization and it seems that no one is complaining about that .com, agreed?

Maybe we need to ask parliament about an "margin" for service members in the CF that would acount for PCAT, soon to be CRA, etc, etc. I don't like the idea of throwing people out the door (I am actually agaisnt just tossing someone right away because they are too hurt to continue) but the reality is being released on a PCAT medical (usually 3B) takes years. Those numbers also hinder recruiting.

So I think Hillier did alright, not perfect, but heck, no of us are. We just need to further refine the changes he began. All in all, I think winning the public over was a huge step, we had to win the psy ops at home first.

[Technoviking]

The doctrine side for infantry? Between Inf School, CTC and LFDTS, somebody should be able to punch up the doctrine (or two, one for the properly equipped enemy aka conventional warfare and one for COIN?).

Last point first: though COIN has been elevated to the realm of the religious, it is but one 'facet' of war, and how the infantry is organised is the same for COIN as for conventional, aid to civil power, humanitarian, UN Peacekeeping, nuclear war, etc.

Having said that, the doctrine from the School is based upon employment, not generation of forces.  For doctrinal purposes, a rifle section has ten soldiers.  If they are reg, reserve or whatever is up to the force generation folks to man.  The doctrine for the Force 2013 model is going to be "on the street" soon, and it addresses not only employment (eg: doctrinal) issues, but generation (eg: peacetime, in garrison, in Canada issues).


I have my own views on things, but meh, I'm just a commissioned corporal.

[MCG]

Although I haven't checked the PSR and what not lately, the Infantry is overmanned by 1200-1400 positions. 

Pedantic point here but – the infantry is overmanned by 1200-1400 soldiers.  The number of positions is relatively fixed and “extra” positions do not exist.

If we do what General leslie suggest, cut the "fat" from NDHQ then we would be able to recruit for other trades, yes? If infantry being overbourne hurts others trades, then so does HQ being overbourne.

Yes and no.  The infantry have extra people.  The “fat” in HQs that is being considered for targeting is positions.  Certainly, we could “balance” the force by ejecting 1200-1400 service personnel and converting their positions to Inf Cpl/Pte, but I don’t think that would be a necessarily intelligent or healthy move for the CF.

The overmanning is a bit deceptive due to structural reasons - the table of organization built into every Infantry battalion's Unit Establishment Report is flawed and does not represent doctrinal (if such a thing can be said to exist) or de facto employment of the infantry.  I've crunched the figures, and over half of this surplus is actually being used in positions we've always taken for granted (ie: 10 man rifle sections) which we're not actually manned for according to the Preferred Manning Level - by the (financial/administrative) books, each Rifle Section get 8 guys.

If dontrinally we are suppossed to have 735.5 soldiers in a battalion (example) then thats what we should strive for. Not leave XX positions open for reserves to man in the event of ops. That also doesn't work when say a domestic snap operation comes up (Ice storms, earth quakes, forest fires and floods as examples). Manning should be done properly.

Perhaps part of the problem is also that we allow ourselves to develop & train doctrine that is not constrained by realities.  For as long as I can think, we have been using doctrinal training models (10, 20, 30 & 4 CMBG, Corps 86) that employ human and materiel resources which do not (and never will) exist in the CF.  Perhaps it is also time to ensure our doctrine is also in-line with sustainable and possible resource levels.

At the same time, the establishment of the Army’s field force has been reviewed/revised/revisited/etc at the national level many many times over the last few years.  We have failed to give due attention to our institutional organizational structures to repeatedly answer the strategic question of “how many riflemen belong in a battalion?”.  We have finally reached a point were the establishment of every infantry battalion (with one exception) is the same across the country.  There are policies and concepts that link our FG structure with the FE structure we want to deploy.  These are articulated at various levels and for all branches.  If we want full doctrinal brigades fully manned, then I suspect we will have to start converting infantry to other occupations just to achieve two brigades.  Significantly growing the field force has already been ruled-out as a feasable CoA at the stratigic level.

Having said that, the doctrine from the School is based upon employment, not generation of forces.  For doctrinal purposes, a rifle section has ten soldiers.  If they are reg, reserve or whatever is up to the force generation folks to man. 

An important fact in this discussion. 

If only the Army had a body tasked with maintaining doctrine and promulgating it.  Or, if only the body tasked with doing such things actually did them...

I think I've recently seen a proposal that was aimed at getting said body better focused on its actual task  .... http://forums.army.ca/forums/index.php/topic,99602.msg1022040.html#msg1022040

Although, if we did publish a “Force Generation Doctrine” would it be DAD or another entity that should be the author?

[Oldgateboatdriver]

In the eighties, we had a saying about CDS' selection: "If you want good leadership, get an Army general, good administration, an Admiral and good politics, an Air Force general".

When Gen. Hillier took over, we were in serious need of leadership in the CF and the good general certainly provided that. He certainly reminded the officer corps (all three elements) that good leadership was our primary duty. Does this mean all his decision were correct? No. But the overall effect was certainly positive. Now we should just correct what went amiss without dismissing the man.

Also, though I do not know much about the Army doctrine, I read a lot of military history: It seems to me one of the constant in Canadian military history is that in all major wars we participated in, we were chronically short on infantry. Considering we were in Afghanistan for the long run when the General was CDS, his decision to fill all the infantry regiment to strength while he could seems reasonable, even if it caused some hardship in other trades.

[Old Sweat]

The discussion re the results of a decision to over recruit infantry is fascinating. It also is more than a little sad.

I would like to raise another issue, one about which I really know squat other than what I learned from the media and on this site. That issue is the resurrection of the tank. It seems to me that when Gen Hillier was CLS he announced that heavy armour was being phased out and "replaced" by the MGS. Operations in Afghanistan in 2006 showed that we needed something to knock big holes in compound walls and grape huts, and that the best solution was the tank. In my opinion, it was to his credit as CDS that he accepted that he erred, or at least could be accused of the same, and was able to convince the government not only to bring back our Leopard fleet, but to also buy the Leo 2. According to what I have seen, there were some mistakes made in the programme, but I am not sure we can blame him for every thing that goes wrong.

I have kicked around the army and the CF for quite a while and have seen some colossal egos that would not have countenanced ever admitting anything short of near-papal infallibility. He at least had the balls to do so, and to do so quickly and effectively. Or what have I missed?

[jollyjacktar]

Hear, Hear Old Sweat!  I can just imagine Gen Baril or Prince John de C. admitting they were wrong... not bloody likely.  Oh wait, Baril said it was his subordinates who were in the wrong.  General Rick, being human may have made some mistakes along the road.  But Goddam, I am glad that he was driving the bus back in the day.  We would  be one sorry collection of crap nowadays if some of the inmates of Ottawa got their hands on the tiller back then. 

If we have more Cbt Arms than we need at present, so what.  It will adjust itself in the not to distant future, perhaps the focus should be on raising the bar for numbers of boots on the ground then.

[dapaterson]

How many of those overbourne in the infantry trades are guys waiting to be put on PCAT or sent to a JPSU from severe injuries in Afghanistan? Does anybody have a statistic for that?

Unless one in six infrantrymen are in that situation, there is still a problem.

Also, NEVER mind cutting infantry. If we do what General leslie suggest, cut the "fat" from NDHQ then we would be able to recruit for other trades, yes? If infantry being overbourne hurts others trades, then so does HQ being overbourne.

There are two different issues at play:

The infantryman occupation has more bums than chairs - hence describing it as overborne.  (MSE Op is in a similar situation, but is a much smaller trade, so we don't talk about them as much)

HQs are not overborne.  That is, they don't have a mismatch between bums and chairs.  The problem as posited by LGen Leslie (among others) say that there are too many chairs; reducing the number of chairs in HQs means those chairs can be asssigned to other places.

If dontrinally we are suppossed to have 735.5 soldiers in a battalion (example) then thats what we should strive for. Not leave XX positions open for reserves to man in the event of ops. That also doesn't work when say a domestic snap operation comes up (Ice storms, earth quakes, forest fires and floods as examples). Manning should be done properly.

But we also have a finite number of chairs (PYs) assigned to the Army, so choices have to be made.  To provide those extra chairs to the Inf Bns, what is the Army willing to sacrifice?  Folks much higher on the food chain than you or I decided that this was the best option to ensure the capabilities needed would be available.

Personally, I find it funny that we are complaining of having too many combat troops (Not too often in history of the CF did you hear that).

Now, the .coms, not every thing is perfect when it first comes out and tweakings are neccessary as a result of lessons learned. So I am guessing, a single CAN OP COM would be ideal to replace CEFCOM, CAN COM and CANOSCOM? I do think CANSOFCOM should remain its own entity, thats a tiny organization and it seems that no one is complaining about that .com, agreed?

Keeping CANSOF its own command makes some sense.  Streamlining the bloat and inefficiency that marks the rest of the dot COMs should free up chairs (PYs) for other important things.  Investing nearly 10% of the Regular Force expansion chairs (PYs) into more NDHQ, a choice made by Gen Hillier, was in my opinion a suboptimal use of resources.

Maybe we need to ask parliament about an "margin" for service members in the CF that would acount for PCAT, soon to be CRA, etc, etc. I don't like the idea of throwing people out the door (I am actually agaisnt just tossing someone right away because they are too hurt to continue) but the reality is being released on a PCAT medical (usually 3B) takes years. Those numbers also hinder recruiting.

Parliament gives us a great deal of latitude in determining how we run things; the fault lies not with our stars but with ourselves.  We could structure ourselves to permit those things without our current structure, but choose not to do so.  Adding more money and chairs to do so would elad to some bright MBA somewhere, eventually, to redirect those chairs and funding to other bright ideas, and we'd end up back where we started.

So I think Hillier did alright, not perfect, but heck, no of us are. We just need to further refine the changes he began.

Refine and in some places replace, but I agree.

All in all, I think winning the public over was a huge step, we had to win the psy ops at home first.

PsyOps, doctrinally, is an asset we use only against enemies and third parties, and do not employ in domestic scenarios at all.   

[Jed]

I have kicked around the army and the CF for quite a while and have seen some colossal egos that would not have countenanced ever admitting anything short of near-papal infallibility. He at least had the balls to do so, and to do so quickly and effectively. Or what have I missed?

I with you on this one Old Sweat

[dapaterson]

Hear, Hear Old Sweat!  I can just imagine Gen Baril or Prince John de C. admitting they were wrong... not bloody likely.  Oh wait, Baril said it was his subordinates who were in the wrong.

That was Boyle, not Baril.

General Rick, being human may have made some mistakes along the road.  But Goddam, I am glad that he was driving the bus back in the day.  We would  be one sorry collection of crap nowadays if some of the inmates of Ottawa got their hands on the tiller back then. 

If we have more Cbt Arms than we need at present, so what.  It will adjust itself in the not to distant future, perhaps the focus should be on raising the bar for numbers of boots on the ground then.

The excess of Infantrymen will not "adjust itself" in the near future.  It impacts every trade that is short right now and will continue to do so for the next decade - since reduced recruiting today for those trades due to the infantry overage means the training pipeline won't meet their requirements for years beyond. 

[E.R. Campbell]

That was Boyle, not Baril.
...

It was Baril, too ... he was caught in a big lie when he supported Chretien when the latter said the CF told him it could not get him from Whistler to Amman (Jordan) in time for King Hussein's funeral. Turns out that the trip, which protocol rather demanded a high level Canadian delegation, was well within the CF's capabilities but Chretien didn't want to interrupt his ski vacation with his family. Baril was, in my personal opinion a far worse CDS (and officer and, indeed, human being) than Boyle. Compared to Baril Hillier was both saint and organizational genius.

[Technoviking]

The number of PYs for Infantry Battalions (Reg Force) is limited to 5394 all ranks.  This does not cover all Infantryman and Infantry Officer PYs: several are external to the battalions, such as at training institutions, HQs, etc.  With that number, and with 9 infantry battalions, that translates into 599 PYs per battalion, plus 1 extra PY in each of the 3rd battalions, and this is for the Jump Master (not required in the other battalions).

With only 599 PYs/battalion, that means that there are 3 "shadow" rifle companies, with equally "shadow" HQs, Sp and Admin Coys.  If we went to six battalions, not only would we be able to BPT conduct our 4 lines of operation, but it would also provide "PY-Room" for reintroducing capabilities that many consider missing from the Infantry.  These include integral indirect fire support and integral mobility and counter-mobility support.

To illustrate, if a Force Employment Infantry Battalion were deemed to be 1100 (not far off of the model), then 501 reservists and other augmentees are required per battalion.  With 898 regular members in a six-battalion model, then only 202 augmentees would be required (including an all-reserve fourth rifle company, as per the model).  Why it would never go this way is because, for some reason, we need 9 battalions.

The fallacy is in the optics of the Managed Readiness Plan.  If you look at it, you would be led to believe that 2 PPCLI deployed to Afghanistan once: on TF 1-08.  Guess who formed rifle companies for Op Apollo in 2001/02, TF 3-06 and TF 1-07?  That's right, 2 PPCLI.  And I'm sure there are other occasions. 

But, as I said before, I'm only a comissioned corporal, so it's all good, and the pay still comes twice monthly.

[ArmyRick]

The Psy Ops remark was not literal... I think I know that Psy Ops are an OPERATIONAL assett/capability

Its like people saying we have to win the PR battle... Your not literally in a battle with the public.

[jollyjacktar]

I did reply earlier but it did not take.

That was Boyle, not Baril.

Yes, you are correct.  It was Boyle I was thinking of in that instance not Baril.  My bad.  I'll leave E.R.'s comment on Baril stand on it's own merit as I agree with it.

The excess of Infantrymen will not "adjust itself" in the near future.  It impacts every trade that is short right now and will continue to do so for the next decade - since reduced recruiting today for those trades due to the infantry overage means the training pipeline won't meet their requirements for years beyond. 

I will agree to disagree with you on this.  Of course your idea of near future might not be the same as mine.   I'm thinking of a couple of years.  While this situation does have immediate impact on how many of this and that the different trades have access to, I do believe it will sort it'self out in the near future.  As can be attested to by those who are members of, the Cbt Arms uses people up quicker than most other occupations.  Over the next couple of years it could reasonably be expected to see a number of folks leave for various reasons such as retirement, injury, remuster and not finding peacetime soldiering to their taste after the drawdown in the sandbox.  And IIRC there is ongoing at present an attempt to entice Infantry types over to the Navy.  I daresay that in my time scale of thought, most of this problem will have  been sorted out more or less.  And as I said earlier, this give an opportunity to make a case for increases in the establishment, manning wise.  Maybe my head is up my butt, but I do feel that it will get sorted out.

[CDN Aviator]

   I'm thinking of a couple of years. 

During that couple of years, the infantry has an overage to fill line numbers from. Other trades suffere from compounding : They lose people to attrition and are unable to recruit and train replacements. Not being able to train replacements now means that there will be a shortage of members capable of filling supervisory roles in a "couple of years".

[jollyjacktar]

During that couple of years, the infantry has an overage to fill line numbers from. Other trades suffere from compounding : They lose people to attrition and are unable to recruit and train replacements. Not being able to train replacements now means that there will be a shortage of members capable of filling supervisory roles in a "couple of years".

I'm sorry, I must be thick as crap.  Yes, there will be some short term pain here and there.  But there are over 100 trades in the CF to spread it amongst.  The Cbt Arms will not hold onto the 1000 spots for the entire period, they will lose numbers (hopefully quickly) over this time frame and the pain will ease.  We were jammed to death for the 90's, while shitty, the sky did not fall in and life carried on.  Life will carry on for the rest of us too.

[CDN Aviator]

  We were jammed to death for the 90's, while shitty, the sky did not fall in and life carried on. 

Yup and several trades, including my own, were an inch away from colapse as a result. You should come see the experience gap in some of the air tech trades, all result of the 90s.

[jollyjacktar]

And that lasted years, more than two,  to bring that about.  I don't honestly see this will have the same impact over the whole structure.  I still believe this will correct in a bearable time frame.  And, your trade survived nevertheless.  It will again.

[Infanteer]

Pedantic point here but – the infantry is overmanned by 1200-1400 soldiers.  The number of positions is relatively fixed and “extra” positions do not exist.

True - my mistake.

We have failed to give due attention to our institutional organizational structures to repeatedly answer the strategic question of “how many riflemen belong in a battalion?”.  We have finally reached a point were the establishment of every infantry battalion (with one exception) is the same across the country.

Actually, the opposite is true.  I did a line-by-line look at Unit Establishment Reports and not 1 battalion is the same in terms of officers and NCMs, infantry or otherwise.  In fact, very few companies are similar in organization.

The fallacy is in the optics of the Managed Readiness Plan.  If you look at it, you would be led to believe that 2 PPCLI deployed to Afghanistan once: on TF 1-08.  Guess who formed rifle companies for Op Apollo in 2001/02, TF 3-06 and TF 1-07?  That's right, 2 PPCLI.  And I'm sure there are other occasions.

I termed this a "force generation gap"; and it's real.  You wonder why no battalion has been able to mount an entire battlegroup by itself since 2002?  Because our management of butts and seats is generally poor and we need to do the same scrape every tour.  At the macro-level, a force gen/force employment split makes sense in that it allows sub-units to be moved where they are needed.  However, at the micro-level the gap cannot exist; a variation in sub-units means you have to juggle.  What's the purpose of "force generation" if the same soldiers are being shuffled about to fill different CFTPO numbers?

My 2 cents anyways....

[ltmaverick25]

There is another factor to consider when discussing the MOC imbalance issue.

Many of our undermanned trades are not considered very attractive both by new recruits and by those who are currently in said trades.  I'm thinking naval ops trades specifically here.  (I don't know much about the other trades in this situation so my comments are directed exclusively towards naval ops trades).  In my opinion, we need to do a heck of alot more then just reduce the overmanning of the infantry to repair naval ops trades in duress.  Guys in those trades are leaving in droves.  During my time in Victoria, many of the sailors I met were trying to VOT to combat arms because they were convinced they would have a better life.  We treat our sailors like absolute crap.  We have fancy recruiting videos that look pretty sexy from a Navy point of view, but we keep losing guys out the back door.  If we want to fix trades in duress we need to carefully examine why these trades are not popular.  We need to treat our people better, we need better leadership; all of the things that Hillier represented..

Another point.  Many tech oriented trades that require a minimum of level 2 security clearance for basic MOC training are suffering, not because of lack of recruits but rather, because their recruits spend 3 years on PAT platoon waiting for a security clearance.  You should see how many guys are stuck in Kingston waiting for their clearances for courses.  Streamlining clearances would go a long way to fixing SOME trades in duress.

As for General Hillier.  He gets max props from me.  If it were not for him, and some other factors, our organization would be in complete shambles right now.  Nobody is perfect, but as far as I am concerned he is the absolute best CDS we have seen in a long time, and likely for a long time to come.

We like to complain about staff bloat and the dot coms.  But, from my experience working in a HQ, we tend to have too many guys sitting around when nothing is going on, but then, all of a suden something serious goes down, and we dont have nearly enough guys to do the job in a timely fashion.

[dapaterson]

We like to complain about staff bloat and the dot coms.  But, from my experience working in a HQ, we tend to have too many guys sitting around when nothing is going on, but then, all of a suden something serious goes down, and we dont have nearly enough guys to do the job in a timely fashion.

To the contrary, we have too many to do the job effectively.  Our "modern" planning processes churn out oversize plans and orders that attempt to teach everyone to suck eggs.

An Op Order should be, at most, ten pages.  Including annexes.  Add in an admin order of about the same length.  That's all that should be required for any CF operation.

If we are producing excess staff verbiage to show how smart we are, or including many minute details because we have no standard operating procedures, then we've failed as a military to plan and to train ourselves.

Over large staffs produce over large staff work.  Over large staff work creates excess demands on lower formations to comply with all the crap tossed at them from above.  That serves no one's interests.

[MCG]

Actually, the opposite is true.  I did a line-by-line look at Unit Establishment Reports and not 1 battalion is the same in terms of officers and NCMs, infantry or otherwise.  In fact, very few companies are similar in organization.

As TV mentioned - watch for the Army to publish the Force 2013 establishments very soon.

[Thucydides]

I had to laugh at this line:

We like to complain about staff bloat and the dot coms.  But, from my experience working in a HQ, we tend to have too many guys sitting around when nothing is going on, but then, all of a suden something serious goes down, and we dont have nearly enough guys to do the job in a timely fashion.

I've worked at a Brigade HQ as well. Half the time we were chasing our tails with reports and returns to higher, half the time we were demanding the same reports and returns from subordinate units, and the rest of the time...

We did get sucked into the OPP model for a while, spending inordinate amounts of time planning Brigade level exercises and so on. It go to the point that I looked at a Master Events Matrix printed off a plotter which had a week long exercise divided into 15 min increments. If a truck had a flat tire during a road move or someone had to stop to fix a radio the entire chain of events could be toppled in a domino fashion...I also participated in creating an exercise instruction which filled a CD; if converted to MS Word documents the amount of data would equal a 20,000 page instruction. During OP CADENCE, I was on the receiving end of the paper monster, filling out more forms etc. than I did to deploy to Afghanistan.

Getting rid of HQ bloat would mean that there would not be the manpower to create such monstrosities.

In fairness to Gen Hillier, I think the ultimate plan with the .coms was to replace existing HQ's with the .coms. Now if that really was the case, then the issue is completing the transition between the existing structure to the .com structure. Then again, I could be out to lunch on that, but that was the impression I got from the various briefings etc. presented when the plan first came out and the .coms were standing up.

[PPCLI Guy]

I termed this a "force generation gap"; and it's real.  You wonder why no battalion has been able to mount an entire battlegroup by itself since 2002?  Because our management of butts and seats is generally poor and we need to do the same scrape every tour. 

I have a completely different take on this - the gap is not with Force generation, rather it is with Force Employment.  We need to discipline ourselves, and go to war with the org that we train with.  If that means adjusting tasks and expectations, so be it.  The Navy has never offered up 1 1/2 frigates for ops, and yet we routinely offer 1 1/2 Bns.  You could argue that we would have been better off in the long run to have committed 2 x FG base Bns at a time to Astan over the last 6 years, rather than 1 1/2 Bns and 3 1/2 HQs...

[bossi]

Former general inspires chamber dinner audience
By SHANNON QUESNEL / THE STANDARD / QMI AGENCY
Posted 7 days ago
http://www.elliotlakestandard.ca/ArticleDisplay.aspx?e=3355624#.Truwgcl_wX8.facebook

Canada's former top military officer, General Rick Hillier, stayed on target throughout his presentation on what it takes to be a leader at the Elliot Lake and District Chamber of Commerce 21st Annual Excellence in Business Awards Dinner on Oct. 26.

In front of hundreds of guests in a packed Collins Hall, Hillier had the audience glued to their seats with tales, lessons and mistakes he has made, the amazing people he met and was inspired by, and how he attempted to inspire others whether they were soldiers under his command or just regular citizens. Following his presentation Hillier signed copies of his new book, Leadership: 50 Points of Wisdom for Today's Leaders.

The evening was not only about the former general. It was also a time to pay respects to military veterans, currently serving soldiers, the families of those who died and business leaders who through hard work earned honours presented by the chamber of commerce.

The first award presented was to Wil's Cove for Service Excellence.

The Red Briffett Award for Community Involvement went to Pierre Vaillancourt of Elliot Lake Foodland.

And the chamber President's Award for Economic Development went to the Fireside Classic Grill.

Just before Hillier began his presentation, the former general honoured Truus Barry.

Barry's husband, Dennis Barry, died as a result of his time serving in Canada's military as a master warrant officer. Dennis Barry worked a post as a United Nations peacekeeper.

"It is my distinct honour to provide you with the enclosed Memorial Cross in memory of your husband who passed away from having served his country," says Hillier as he pinned the medal to her blouse.

"For decades Canada's young men and women have sacrificed all they have known including all the comforts of home in order to defend the rights of others in distant lands.

"Canadians have always stood up to defend the ideals of democracy and the rule of law.

"We owe it to them to learn, to understand and appreciate their sacrifice."

Truus Barry was moved by the gesture and said she was honoured.

Fair warning

Following this ceremony Hillier was given the floor.

"I am a Newfoundlander and we Newfoundlanders love to talk. And you invited me here, so, I am just warning you."

In addition to knowing how to talk Hillier knows how to lead. In 2000, he took command of NATO's Stabilization Force's Multinational Division (Southwest) in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Then in May of 2003, Hillier was appointed as Commander of the Army and in October of that same year, he was selected as the commander of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, Afghanistan.

Hillier was promoted again in 2005 and assumed duties as the Chief of the Defence Staff on Feb. 4, 2005. He retired July 1, 2008.

Hillier says many Newfoundlanders went to the Joey Smallwood school of public speaking. Smallwood was the first premier of Newfoundland and Labrador and was known for being outspoken and brash.

"And Joey used to say if something was worth saying once it's worth saying five, six or seven times. And he would also say if you have an audience captive, and you got them on their back with your foot on their throat, for God's sake don't let them up until you have your complete say."

Hillier also heard, but maybe never took, the advice of his father who told him the opposite.

"Every time you get a standing ovation you should shut up and sit down right away because it only goes downhill from there."

Leaders have to be more than good speakers though. Being a leader is hard work, good leaders come in all shapes and sizes and getting a good start in life helps a lot.

Hillier appreciates the work done by Canada's cadet program.

"It is the best program in our country for developing responsible citizens out of young men and women," he says to the crowd and to the cadets listening in the Collins Hall.

Being a cadet means leadership, outdoor living, independence and "getting things done instead of talking about getting things done. These kids are pretty incredible."

The military man also appreciates the rule of law.

"Secondly, I just want to recognize, as a soldier, I went around the world and we tried to help other countries obtain some of what we have."

One of them is the rule of law and the work done by law enforcement.

"We do appreciate our police officers," he says, especially when they let a person off the hook.

"Never miss an opportunity to suck up to a police officer."

He learned this lesson in 1995 when he returned to Canada after serving in Bosnia.

"I was coming home for a short break, really tired and been away for five to six months from my wife. I was really looking forward to getting home," he says, which was in Ottawa. He now lives in Newfoundland.

Despite his best efforts Hillier was going to be late. Due to problems in Bosnia he missed two connecting flights.

"I got into Ottawa at one o'clock in the morning and… I was really anxious to get home right? I was driving out of the airport parkway like a bat out of hell and I was thinking about nothing else. And all of a sudden I see those proverbial red lights in the rear view."

Hillier pulled his rented car off the road and waited for the RCMP officer to come over. He didn't necessarily plead with the officer, but he admits he worked him for sympathy. He pointed out he was a soldier, back for a short stay after six months away, eager to see his wife, etc.

Instead of writing him a ticket the officer took a different approach.

"He looked at me again and said, 'Sir, follow me.' I swear to God, he jumped in his car, kept the lights on, and away we went. Ever since then I have had a weak spot for police officers."

Getting a good start in life and appreciating the rule of law were just two of the lessons learned.

Must be robust

Another is strength.

"I'm going to tell you two things. One is as a Newfoundlander there are two tips that I saw in leaders. One is a robustness, a toughness. And I don't mean you're tough on somebody else.

"I am talking about spiritual and mental and physical toughness. Being a leader is tough, and there are long days and sometimes things go horribly wrong. And if you are not robust at the time people need you most you may fail if you are not robust. And that is one of the characteristics every leader should have.

"And the second characteristic is optimism… which manifests itself in passion and confidence in what you are doing."

Leaders should use these attributes to inspire those that follow them.

During a dinner on Canada's East Coast to recognize an educational institution, Hillier met a 103-year-old doctor who not only drives himself to work four days a week with his Ford Taurus, but lives at home alone.

"He lives by himself, has no home care and still maintains an office. He is consulted by other physicians and specialists. His daughter, was a spritely 78 years old, came over from England to visit with daddy and during dinner he drank more white wine than me, which was a copious amount, so much so we wouldn't let him drive home.

"Obviously, he was robust right? The optimism part came in when he told me, when he bought the Ford Taurus, he bought the extended five-year warranty."

Hillier's Elliot Lake audience burst into laughter.

"Robustness and optimism."

Guess what

"The third thing I believe in and sometimes I get wrong is communication."

Leaders should never forget to communicate, not only to their subordinates and superiors, but also to those closest to them.

A case in point is when Hillier forgot to tell his wife he applied for what would be his biggest job.

"Let me give you a third leadership tip. If you are ever selected to go off and (do a project) you should remember to tell your wife.

"In August of 2003, I was the army commander in Ottawa and Canada was positioning itself to take command of the mission in Afghanistan. And I was on a short list of army senior commanders who could do the job."

The Canadian government had a list with the names of five individuals. Included was his own name something he promptly forgot about.

It was only later that he remembered.

"One night after a long day at work, I got in the house about quarter to nine. We flick on the TV."

The lead story was the secretary-general of NATO announced a Canadian commander would be taking over the NATO Afghanistan mission.

"And then he went on to say that one of our three-star generals will be away commanding that mission for the next year.

"Joyce (his wife) was looking at the TV, put her wine glass down and looked at me and asked, 'Tell me again how many three-star army generals we actually have?' And I said, 'Babe, we have one.'"

Hillier forgot to tell his wife he opted to command the NATO's forces in Afghanistan.

"Communication is a must."

Being inspired

Inspiration can be a contagious thing.

Hillier says, "Leaders inspire people to do things they never thought possible. And leaders draw inspiration from those people that keep themselves going during the tough days. I see it as a cycle.

"I'm (also) a past master of the frustrations of trying to inspire people and draw inspiration from them because ladies and gentleman I'm a Toronto Maple Leafs fan."

Throughout his career Hillier has been inspired by not only by the men and women under his command, but regular citizens.

"We found our inspiration in those leaders that sometimes you wouldn't recognize," he says, such as Newfoundlander Gladys Osmond.

"She is a retired Salvation Army officer. And one of the things we worried about when I was a commander is keeping Canada's sons and daughters who were deployed in dirty and dangerous places for long periods of time… to keeping them linked right back to this country.

"We discovered that leaders like this lady were actually helping us do that."

Since 1995, Osmond has been writing letters that can be accepted by any member of Canada's Armed Forces. These letters were written by hand and mailed in envelopes.

"She wrote 250 letters a month, and I have been the beneficiary of many of them."

Many of these letters, along with other correspondence, were delivered to soldiers on the front lines.

"You are in a mission, you're into a fire fight and you roll back into a bit of shelter, try to collect your thoughts. And you are thinking you are all alone in the world and there goes the quartermaster on his hands and knees.

"And he throws a bundle of letters toward you. You open it up and in it is a letter from Gladys Osmond. It's incredible. First of all she writes the most boring arcane s*** you've ever heard."

Osmond would pen details like how much snow has fallen, what her neighbours were up to, what she baked, etc. While they might not have been exciting letters like hers were valuable, says Hillier.

It reminded soldiers of home.

In addition she formed the granny brigade with the average age of members being 94 years. All of them now write letters to Canadian soldiers.

Unorthodox

Being an inspiring leader can also mean being unorthodox or in the case of one Canadian soldier, Ernest 'Smokey' Smith, being constantly promoted and demoted.

Hillier says this Second World War Canadian soldier, who was awarded the Victoria Cross, started his legacy by knocking out two enemy tanks and destroying a platoon. He was promoted to lance corporal and then demoted soon after when he got into a drunken brawl.

This process of heroism followed by a string of crazy acts, including one time when Smokey stole a jeep, repeated itself. From January 1944 to June 1944 commanding officers promoted Smith to lance corporal and demoted him to private nine times.

"The young men and women who serve today would rather lay their life down than let down the legacy this man has handed to us.

"When you can use that kind of motivation and dedication in a positive manner you can change the world."

Being a leader also means meeting the physical needs of those following. In the case of the Canadian Forces going to Kandahar, Afghanistan it meant bringing Tim Hortons overseas.

After some troops made it known to Hillier about this he did what he could do.

Motivated by Hillier's words to the corporate world and by 43,000 email requests Tim Hortons top brass got on the problem. Soon enough a small Tim Hortons outlet was in Kandahar.

Of course despite the financial success of that Tim Hortons it had its share of problems.

"You've been through a Tim Hortons drive through right? You've never seen a drive through work so well until you've seen one with a 65-ton main battle tank pull up with the officer asking for 24 coffees to go. It was one of those special Canadian moments.

"We were inspired by Tim Hortons' actions and their commitment to Canada's sons and daughters."
- 30 -

[gun runner]

I have just finished his book 'Leadership'. I was impressed by how he wove his experience in our Armed Forces into the lessons for young leaders to follow. A good book. My . 

[Good2Golf]

...In fairness to Gen Hillier, I think the ultimate plan with the .coms was to replace existing HQ's with the .coms. Now if that really was the case, then the issue is completing the transition between the existing structure to the .com structure. Then again, I could be out to lunch on that, but that was the impression I got from the various briefings etc. presented when the plan first came out and the .coms were standing up.

Thucydides, you're as far out to lunch as you think. 

Had things gone the way Gen Hillier wanted initially, we would have actually had a fairly streamlined joint strat HQ structure:

3* CFE (Chief Force Employment) with two 2* (Expeditionary and Domestic)
3* CFG (Chief Force Generation) [like US FORSCOM] with the 3 ECS responsive to CFG using a CF managed-readiness model
3* CFD (Chief Force Development) and ECS FD elements under CFD direction.

For those who remember things before, the CFE/Exp/Dom construct would have been near identical to DCDS/COS J3 Intl/COS J3 Cont.  That (CFE) was relatively okay, but there was huge pushback on the CFG construct.  One environment was particularly vehement in its refusal to accept the CFG proposal, believing that there was essentially no place for large-scale jointness in what it did (both FG and FE).  Another environment was relatively okay with things, so long as its responsibilities to existing bilateral capabilities weren't impacted (which it wouldn't have been).  The other environment was okay with things generally, particularly the CFG thing, but had some concerns about stewardship/leadership of its generated force abroad, once deployed.

In the end, the pushback was significant enough that Gen Hillier went with the back up plan, COA 2, which was 2 x 3* for CFE functionality (CEEFCOM and CanadaCOM), leaving the FG principally to the environment, then adding some CF-wide enablers (CANOSCOM) to consolidate previously underappreciated/supported logistical issues. CFD survived, but was knocked down from a 3* to a 2*, but at least stewards CF-wide force development as originally intended within Plan A.

The "bloat" as many refer to came principally from the environments not anteing in as much to the new constructs as Gen Hillier had tried to secure (and the environments generally agreed to) - fiefdoms remained and the overall result was that Gen Hillier's vision of consolidated command stewardship was somewhat (significantly?) diluted by functional silos.

 

Regards
G2G

[MCG]

Had things gone the way Gen Hillier wanted initially, we would have actually had a fairly streamlined joint strat HQ structure:

3* CFE (Chief Force Employment) with two 2* (Expeditionary and Domestic)
3* CFG (Chief Force Generation) [like US FORSCOM] with the 3 ECS responsive to CFG using a CF managed-readiness model
3* CFD (Chief Force Development) and ECS FD elements under CFD direction.

There have been a few theoretical CF models proposed by members of this site which have significant similarity to this.  It would have been an interesting structure to see in operation had we been successful in building it.